Can there be genuine moral dilemmas? Some say no; it would be, or entail, a contradiction. Others say yes; such things are actual, therefore possible. I criticize standard lines of dilemmatic defense, but side with the defense against standard arguments well presented by David Brink. A leading analogy: moral dilemmas are no more logically offensive than checkmate (another case in which absolute obligations clash: always move out of check; never move into it.) I argue that Brink-style arguments against dilemmas unwittingly (...) and fallaciously stipulate away the possibility of bad behavior. (shrink)

: J.S. Mill declares the true liberal prays for enlightened opposition. Slavoj Žižek's anti-liberal Kierkegaardian-Leninist philosophy, as presented in On Belief, is sized up as an opponent but fails to measure up philosophically. Žižek is not clear-headed; doesn't understand Kierkegaard; doesn't understand Lenin; or is too much of a soft-hearted liberal who only wishes he weren't. Žižek fears liberalism may threaten freedom. But the threats he sees — although real — are old news to liberals. Lionel Trilling-inspired hints concerning the (...) proper care and feedings of the liberal imagination conclude the paper. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: McCloud's Definition Pictures and Comics Panels, Panels Everywhere Seeing‐in and Closure Pictureless Comics? Wordless Prints, Unprinted Words Spaces Between Words The Air of Non‐Pictures A Continuum of Cases Comic Books and Ideal Books Notes References.